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In this work, we aim to contribute to the understanding of the human pro-social behavior by studying the
influence that a particular form of social pressure “being watched” has on the evolution of cooperative behavior.
We study how cooperation emerge in multiplex complex topologies by analyzing a particular bidirectionally-
coupled dynamics on top of a two-layers multiplex network (duplex). The coupled dynamics appears between
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in a network, and a threshold cascade model in the other. The threshold model
is intended to abstract the behavior of a network of vigilant nodes, that impose pressure of being observed
altering hence the temptation to defect of the dilemma. Cooperation or defection in the game also affects
the state of a node of being vigilant. We analyze these processes on different duplex networks structures and
assess the influence of the topology, average degree and correlated multiplexity, on the outcome of cooperation.
Interestingly, we find that the social pressure of vigilance may impact cooperation positively or negatively,
depending on the duplex structure, specifically the degree correlations between layers is determinant. Our
results give further quantitative insights in the promotion of cooperation under social pressure.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
Human cooperation is a ubiquitous yet not fully-understood
phenomenon. Explaining how cooperation emerges and with-
stands selfish behaviors is one of the biggest challenges in nat-
ural and social sciences. Multiple mechanisms have been pro-
posed to explain under which conditions cooperation emerges
and is sustained: direct reciprocity (repetition), indirect reci-
procity (reputation), spatial selection, multilevel (group) se-
lection, and kin selection [1–3].
Evolutionary Game Theory [4–6] is the arena to analyze the
evolution of cooperation. In the last years, the analytical re-
sults of the theory are faced against experimental studies with
humans facing game theoretical dilemmas [7–10]. Interest-
ingly enough, these experiments have challenged the way we
understand human cooperation, and more work on the conse-
quences of these experiments have to follow.
Another way to approach the understanding of the evolu-
tion of cooperation in human societies consist in deciphering
the cooperative behavior in ancient communities from histor-
ical records. In a previous work [15] we studied cooperation
in the Yamana society that inhabited the Beagle Channel in
Argentina, with respect to sharing beached whales (a scarce,
unpredictable and valuable resource). In that work we ob-
served that the emergence of an informal network of vigilance
promoted cooperation.
Historically, ancient societies have exploited the power that
images of watchful eyes have on people. We can find ex-
amples in totem monuments decorated with eyes to enhance
charitable behaviors in tribes [16]; in different religions us-
ing this power promote honesty [16], which is coherent with
the Supernatural Monitoring Hypothesis, which states that
the perception of being watched promotes pro-social behav-
ior [17, 18].“They remind us that our actions have conse-
quences” [16].
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The essential idea is that being watched can play an impor-
tant role in promoting pro-social cooperative behavior. Sev-
eral field studies have found evidence of humans exposing a
pro-social behavior when being observed by others (recently
confirmed in a field experiment with 2,000 individuals [19])
and also under the presence of subtle cues of being watched.
Although there are also some studies that could not find such
evidence. A review on the topic can be found at [20, 21]. A
possible reason for the failure of previous studies in eyes cue
influence is proposed in [21], where the authors found that
people with weak public self-awareness, i.e. people not con-
cerned about how they appear in the eyes of others, are not
affected by the watching eyes phenomena. The observability
effect (the increase of cooperation under vigilance) seems to
be driven by our reputational concerns, bringing the indirect
reciprocity mechanism into play.
This work is aimed to shed light, from a complex net-
works perspective, on the phenomenon above mentioned, i.e.
the emergence of cooperation in a networked society inter-
acting with a network of vigilance. The effect of the struc-
ture of interactions on different social dilemmas has been
largely studied within the scope of network theory over the
past years, from topology influence [11] to spatial and tem-
poral effects [12]. Recently, a new perspective for the rep-
resentation of multiple types of social interactions has been
proposed under the name of multiplex networks. Different
kind of interactions are modeled by different interconnected
layers. This approach has been successfully applied to the
study of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game [13] and also to the
understanding of cooperation in coupled networks [14].
We adopt a similar approach here, modeling our problem in
the scope of multiplex network. Specifically, we investigate
the interplay between two dynamical processes, an evolution-
ary game (a Prisoner’s Dilemma) and dynamical social pres-
sure (a vigilance network evolving according to a threshold
dynamics), and the duplex structure of these interactions.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the defini-
tion of the model in Sec. II. Results obtained by means of
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2simulation are analyzed in Section III. Firstly, we focus our
analysis on the influence of these coupled dynamics on coop-
eration under different monoplex network structures (subsec-
tion III A) and the impact that different costs of vigilance have
on the outcome of cooperation (subsection III B). Secondly in
subsection III C, the analysis moves to a duplex structure of
networks, where we study how the topologies and average de-
grees of the different layers affect cooperation, and also how
the layer-degree correlations can promote or hinder coopera-
tion. Lastly, a modification is introduced on the vigilance dy-
namics, where a vigilance actor can stop being vigilant. The
influence of this dynamics is studied in subsection III D. Fi-
nally we conclude with section IV by summarizing what in-
sights are offered by our work.
II. MODEL DYNAMICS
A. Description of the model
The abstracted framework for our analysis is a networked
system of agents (nodes) playing a theoretical game under vig-
ilance pressures. In particular, our agents play an evolutionary
Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game. The links define the neigh-
borhood of the players and so to whom they are playing with.
The same players involved in the game are also endowed with
a state that define them as vigilant or not. The whole dynam-
ics is composed by an interaction between the game and the
spreading of the vigilant behavior. The game is divided into
two phases: payoff recollection and strategy update. Each
round, node i can choose to play one of the two strategies, co-
operation (C) or defection (D). The PD game can be defined
according to its payoff matrix (entries correspond to the row
player’s payoffs):
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
(1)
where R represents the reward obtained by a cooperator play-
ing against another cooperator, S is the sucker payoff obtained
by a cooperator when she plays against a defector, the temp-
tation payoff, T, is the payoff received by a defector when his
opponent is a cooperator, and finally, P represents the payoff
obtained by a defector which engages with another defector.
In the PD [22], T > R > P > S. We rescale the game
so that it depends on only one parameter, as it is done tradi-
tionally [23]. We define b as the advantage of defectors over
cooperators, being T = b > 1. The values of R and P are
fixed to R = 1 and P = 0 in order to provide a fixed scale
for the game payoffs. Applying this constraint, it turns out
that the selection of the remaining parameters b and S enables
the definition of several games according to their evolutionary
stability. We will focus on the PD with S=0, then being the
only parameter of the game the advantage of defectors over
cooperators b.
For the spreading of the vigilance behavior, we will assume
a cascade of imitation effect. Players activate (become vigi-
lant) (V 0→1i = 1) following a Watt’s threshold model [24]:
V 0→1i (mi, ki) =
 1 if mi/ki > θi,0 if mi/ki ≤ θi, (2)
where mi is the number of neighbors of the node i that are
already vigilant, ki is the degree of node i, and θi the personal
threshold of node i above which she becomes vigilant. Note
that we identify vigilance as a pro-social engagement activ-
ity, then we assume that non-cooperative individuals will not
engage this costly action, i.e. defectors will not be vigilant.
Players are affected by the pressure of being watched by
their neighborhood, which modifies their temptation to defect,
decreasing it as the pressure (percentage of vigilant neighbors)
increases. The individual temptation Ti of node i is:
Ti = R+ (T −R)(1−mi/ki) (3)
where again mi is the number of neighbors of the node i that
are already vigilant, and ki is the degree of node i.
The fitness of an individual is the accumulated payoff after
playing ki PD games with her neighbors.
The second phase of the game is the update of individual
strategies, which is performed each generation. Darwinian
dynamics are introduced to promote the fittest strategy. The
replicator dynamics [25] is the traditional approach for well-
mixed populations (populations with no structure where indi-
viduals play with each other). For evolutionary models, finite
populations and discrete time, the equivalent classic approach
is the use of the proportional imitation rule [26, 27]. The up-
date of strategies is performed as follows. Let N be the num-
ber of individuals in the population, si the strategy the indi-
vidual i is playing, and pii her payoff. With the proportional
imitation rule, each individual i randomly choose one from
her ki neighbors (individual j) and adopts her strategy with
probability:
ptij ≡ P
{
stj → st+1i
}
=

(pitj − piti)/Φ if pitj > piti ,
0 if pitj ≤ piti ,
(4)
where Φ = max(ki, kj)[max(1, T ) − min(0, S)] so that
ptij ∈ [0, 1].
The strategies of the individuals are updated synchronously.
B. Simulations
All simulations presented hereafter have been carried out
for networks of 1000 nodes and results are averaged over at
least 100 different realizations of the initial conditions.
Players are randomly initialized as cooperators or defectors
with equal probability. The cooperators are also equiprobably
chosen to be either vigilant or nonvigilant, while defectors are
always nonvigilant. So, on average, we start with half of the
3population as cooperators, half as defectors and a quarter as
both cooperators and vigilant.
Statistics are measured after a transient of 100,000 gener-
ations and averaged over a time window of 100 generations,
if the system has reached an stationary state defined by the
slope of the average fraction of cooperators 〈ρ〉 being infe-
rior to 10−2, if not, we let the system evolve subsequent time
windows of 100 generations.
III. INTERPLAY BETWEEN STRUCTURE AND
DYNAMICS
A. Cooperation dynamics over a monoplex structure
Firstly, we focus on the aforementioned two
biderectionally-coupled dynamics over a monoplex net-
work. We show that cooperation is significantly enhanced
when players feel the pressure of being watched, indepen-
dently of the topology and the average degree of the network
(Fig. 1). Cooperation promotion is affected by the personal
threshold θi, as Fig. 1(a) shows.
There is a phase transition in 〈ρ〉 as functions of θi. The
critical point happens around 0.5 < θi < 0.8. Values of θi
below this point promote cooperation for both network con-
figurations, as Fig. 1(a) show, and values of θi above the crit-
ical point make no difference in the outcome of cooperation
respect to the case with no vigilance network. It can be ob-
served that values of θi < 0.5 are sufficient to promote coop-
eration and more importantly it can be quantified. The higher
the threshold, the more vigilant neighbors a player need to
become vigilant too, and the more difficult is to promote co-
operation based on vigilance.
The average fraction of cooperators 〈ρ〉 as functions of the
personal threshold θi of the nodes and as functions of the ad-
vantage of defectors b is shown in Fig. 1(b), where green areas
represent cooperation (〈ρ〉 greater than 0.5) and red areas rep-
resent defection (〈ρ〉 lower than 0.5).
The influence of the vigilance network on cooperation is
far more pronounced for the Baraba´si-Albert networks. In the
case for z=4 (Fig. 1(b) bottom left panel), cooperations is fully
achieved in almost all regions of the parameter space. For
z=16 cooperation emerges for b < 1.5 independently of the
θi value, which does not hold for the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network,
cooperation is fully achieved (〈ρ〉 = 1) in a 70% of the pa-
rameter space (b < 1.5 , all θi values; and b ≥ 1.5, θi < 0.4).
Up to now, we have studied a population with the same
personal threshold θi. A more realistic approach is to have a
heterogeneous population, i.e. to initialize the population with
random θi values. If we initialize the θi of the population with
values drawn from a uniform distribution U[0,1], the expected
< θi >= 0.5 and indeed the results for the average fraction of
cooperators 〈ρ〉 are undistinguishable from the ones obtained
when θi = 0.5. This also holds for the duplex network case in
Fig. 3.
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FIG. 1. Simulation results for an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network (upper pan-
els of both subfigures) and Baraba´si-Albert network (bottom panels
of both subfigures) with average degree z=4 (left) and z=16 (right).
Subfigure (a) show the average fraction of cooperators 〈ρ〉 as func-
tions of the advantage of defectors b, and (b) show the average frac-
tion of cooperators 〈ρ〉 as functions of the personal threshold θi of
the nodes (horizontal axis) and as functions of the advantage of de-
fectors b (vertical axis). The maximum SE of all 〈ρ〉 values in the
figure is 0.048.
B. Influence of cost of the vigilance action
So far our analysis of the interplay between vigilance and
cooperation assumed no cost for the vigilance action. How-
ever, a more realistic hypothesis is that vigilance comes at a
certain cost for the action. We have introduced this cost in the
following way: we consider that every agent has to afford a
vigilance cost each generation, which is a fraction (Cv) of her
reward in the game R. Fig. 2 shows the influence of Cv in the
outcome of cooperation for the Baraba´si-Albert network.
When the cost of vigilance is high (0.5R and 0.75R, middle
and left panels of Fig. 2), the vigilance network can promote
cooperation and defection depending on the value of the temp-
tation parameter b. Note that the percentage of vigilant nodes
in the population 〈V 〉 corresponds to the critical point in b (not
the same for all θi) from which full cooperation is dismantled.
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FIG. 2. Average fraction of cooperators 〈ρ〉 (top panels) and average
fraction of vigilant players 〈V 〉 (down panels) for Baraba´si-Albert
networks with z=16 and cost of vigilanceCv 0.25R (left), 0.5R (mid-
dle), 0.75R (right). The higher the cost of vigilance, the lower the
average fraction of cooperators 〈ρ〉 in the regions of b where the pop-
ulation is not fully vigilant. The maximum SE of all 〈ρ〉 values in the
figure is 0.023.
This critical point in b where 〈V 〉 starts to be inferior to 1 can
be used as a predictor for the critical point in b above which
full cooperation disappears, as the dashed vertical grey lines
in Fig. 2 exemplify for several arbitrary θi values. As the cost
of vigilance Cv increases, the critical point (above which full
cooperation is dismantled) is shifted to lower values of b.
C. Cooperation dynamics over a duplex structure
We extend the analysis to a duplex structure of networks:
a network for the game dynamics and a network for the vigi-
lance dynamics. We study the bidirectional coupling of both
layers.
Firstly, we will consider that both layers have the same av-
erage degree and we will study the influence of network topol-
ogy. For a vigilance network with a given average degree and
topology, we study the influence of vigilance layer for differ-
ent game networks topologies. For example, for a vigilance
Baraba´si-Albert network with z=16 (Fig. 3(b) right panels),
the average fraction of cooperators 〈ρ〉 is shown for the case
where the game network is a Baraba´si-Albert network (upper
panel) and an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi network (bottom panel). For the
four vigilance network configurations studied, the vigilance
network has a significant influence in the dynamics of cooper-
ation so that there is no significant difference in the stationary
average fraction of cooperators 〈ρ〉 for different game network
topologies, as it can be seen at Fig. 3. The outcome of coop-
eration is lead by the vigilance network.
Now, let’s focus on the case where vigilance and game lay-
ers have not equal average degree. As Fig. 4 shows, the aver-
age degree of the vigilance layer dominates the dynamics of
cooperation. Indeed, there is no significant difference in the
average fraction of cooperators 〈ρ〉 obtained where the game
layer has the same average degree of the vigilance network or
it is different, and also when the topology of the game layer
is different. It can be seen that each panel in Fig. 4 shows the
same average fraction of cooperators 〈ρ〉 that the one in Fig. 3.
For example, top-left panel in Fig. 4 corresponds to Fig. 3(a)
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(a)Vigilance networks as Erdo¨s-Re´nyi. Game networks as Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (top)
and Baraba´si-Albert (bottom). Both layers with the same degree, z=4 (left) or
z=16 (right).
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(b)Vigilance networks as Baraba´si-Albert. Game networks as Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
(top) and Baraba´si-Albert (bottom). Both layers with the same degree, z=4
(left) or z=16 (right).
FIG. 3. Average fraction of cooperators 〈ρ〉 for a duplex structure
of networks. The combination of network topologies (Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
and Baraba´si-Albert networks) and average degrees (both layers with
the same degree, z=4 or z=16) are explored. The vigilance network
drives the cooperative outcome of the game dynamics. The vigilance
network promotes cooperation as in the monoplex scenario (Fig. 1).
The maximum SE of all 〈ρ〉 values in the figure is 0.05.
left panels, and it also holds for the other panels in Fig. 4
and its correspondence in Fig. 3. Vigilance networks with
higher average degree hinder cooperation, since it is more dif-
ficult for an agent to fulfill her threshold to become vigilant,
and therefore, the diffusion of the vigilance dynamics is more
costly.
Now we study the impact of correlated multiplexity, i. e.
layer-degree correlations, since in real-world complex sys-
tems the degree of nodes in the different layers of the multi-
plex structure are not randomly distributed but correlated. We
focus this study on a duplex structure where both layers are
Baraba´si-Albert networks, as the majority of real-world social
networks present scale free degree distributions with exponent
between 2 and 3.
Results for layers with average degree distribution z = 4
(Fig. 5 left panels) do not show to be influenced significantly
by the correlated multiplexity of their layers. It is not the same
for higher average degrees (Fig. 5 right panels). When the de-
gree distribution of game and vigilance layers are maximally
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FIG. 4. Average fraction of cooperators 〈ρ〉 for a duplex structure
of networks, where layers have different average degrees. Vigilance
and game networks both as Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (top panels), vigilance and
game networks both as Baraba´si-Albert (bottom panels). Vigilance
networks with z=4 and game networks with z= 16 (left panels), vig-
ilance networks with z=16 and game networks with z= 4 (right pan-
els). The maximum SE of all 〈ρ〉 values in the figure is 0.05.
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(a)Maximally positive correlated multiplexity.
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(b)Maximally negative correlated multiplexity.
FIG. 5. Average fraction of cooperators 〈ρ〉 for a duplex structure of
Baraba´si-Albert networks. The degree distributions of the layers are
maximally positive correlated (a) and maximally negative correlated
(b). The average degree of both layers of the duplex is the same, and
takes the values z=4 (left) and z=16 (right). The maximum SE of all
〈ρ〉 values in the figure is 0.044.
positive correlated (Fig. 5(a)), cooperation is fairly promoted
(θi ≤ 0.3 end up with 〈ρ〉 = 1), compared to the uncorrelated
scenario (Fig. 1(a) bottom panels). In the opposite case, where
layers are maximally negative correlated (Fig. 5(b)), coopera-
tion is drastically hindered. The critical point where coopera-
tion is dismantled is shifted to lower b values for all θ values.
In fact, for values of b larger than 1.8 full cooperation in not
achieved for any θ value.
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(a)Inverse threshold model.
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(b)Probability of giving up vigilance.
FIG. 6. Average fraction of cooperators 〈ρ〉 for a duplex structure
of Baraba´si-Albert networks when actors can give up being vigilant,
(a) is there is no enough social pressure in the neighborhood, or (b)
with a probability p=0.05. The average degree of both layers of the
duplex is the same, and takes the values z=4 (left) and z=16 (right).
The maximum SE of all 〈ρ〉 values in the figure is 0.03.
D. Vigilance dynamics with giving up option
So far the dynamics for the vigilance layer accounted that
once an agent has become vigilant, she cannot scape this situa-
tion. In real situations, people can stop feeling social pressure
or just decide to change their opinion/action. In this subsec-
tion, we take into account the possibility of giving up being
vigilant. We approach this by two means: (1) using the thresh-
old of vigilance in a reverse way, and (2) with a probability of
giving up vigilant. We analyze this situation for a duplex of
Baraba´si-Albert networks.
Firstly, lets consider the vigilance dynamics as composed
by two processes: becoming vigilant and becoming nonvigi-
lant. The process of becoming vigilant is the same as in eq. 2.
The process of giving up vigilance V 1→0i follows an inverse
threshold model, where an agent become nonvigilant is there
is not enough vigilant actors in her neighborhood:
V 1→0i (mi, ki) =
 1 if mi/ki ≤ θi,0 if mi/ki > θi, (5)
As Fig. 6(a) shows, the average fraction of cooperation 〈ρ〉
is still influenced by the threshold of vigilance θi. Cooperation
is most costly now, and is only promoted when actors do not
need much social pressure to become vigilant (θi < 0.4 which
is inferior to the threshold needed to promote cooperation in
the case in Fig. 3(b) (down panels).
If actors become vigilant again following a threshold model
(eq. 2) but can give up vigilance with a probability p = 0.05,
we find comparable results (Fig. 6(b)). Slightly higher coop-
eration levels can be found for the case with z=4 and θi = 0.4
(Fig. 6(b), left panel) related to the scenario in Fig. 6(a).
6Broadly, we can conclude that giving the option of stopping
the vigilance action do not hinders cooperation, but there is
few θi values for which cooperation is enhanced.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Summarizing, we have presented a computational analy-
sis of the interplay between vigilance network dynamics and
game dynamics, showing that the pressure of being watched
plays a significant role in the outcome of cooperation, having
both the effect of booster and dismantler. We show that the
conditions for the observability effect to emerge are not triv-
ial, and subsequent experimentation with real humans would
be of much interest to fully understand the impact of being
watched on cooperation. These results clear the ground for a
framework to quantify the promotion of cooperation in struc-
tured populations that use vigilance to enhance pro-social be-
havior.
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